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The Effect of Joint and Several Liability on the Bankruptcy Rate of Defendants:
Evidence from Asbestos Litigation - Under the doctrine of joint and several liabil-
ity, if two defendants jointly share a liability and the ﬁrst becomes insolvent, his
unpaid liabilities may be reallocated to the second, solvent defendant. While the
second defendant’s assets may be sufﬁcient to cover his own share of the liability,
they may be insufﬁcient to also cover the ﬁrst defendant’s unpaid liability. As a
result the ﬁrst defendant’s insolvency may trigger the second defendant’s insol-
vency (White 2002, Cupp 2003).
Thepurposeofthispaperistoquantifythepressurethatonedefendant’sbankruptcy
places on the solvency of co-defendants in the context of mass torts subject to
joint and several liability. The speciﬁc tort we examine is asbestos poisoning. We
choose this example because of the large number of companies – over 61 since
1982 (Stiglitz et al. 2003) – that have gone bankrupt due to asbestos litigation
and the even larger number of companies – perhaps as many as 8,000 (Brickman
2004) – that have been named as defendants in asbestos suits.
Using 10-K data from a number of large asbestos defendants and a data set of
all judgments in asbestos trials, we estimate that the mean per-claim payments by
major defendants grew an additional 5 to 10 percent annually or 56 to 157 percent
altogether between 1990 and 2002 due to the bankruptcy of jointly liable defen-
dants during this period. To put it another way, if no companies had gone bankrupt
between 1990 and 2002, the asbestos liabilities of solvent defendants might have
been less than two-ﬁfths their present size.This result is also a contribution to the literature on bankruptcy and on mass torts.
First, numerous scholars have suggested tort claimants ought to be given superpri-
orityinbankruptcy toreducetheirexposure totheriskof adefendant’sinsolvency.
We demonstrate that, with joint and several liabilities, this risk is actually reallo-
cated to jointly liable but solvent defendants. Tort superpriority would reallocate
some of this risk to other creditors, which seems neither fair nor efﬁcient. Second,
in the debate over how to compensate victims of mass tort – case-by-case litiga-
tion, class actions, valuation in bankruptcy, or legislative trust – one criticism of
piecemeal litigation has been that it leaves the plaintiff bearing the risk of defen-
dant insolvency. Our ﬁndings provide evidence otherwise in the case of joint and
several liabilitiesThe eﬀect of joint and several liability on the
bankruptcy rate of defendants: evidence from
asbestos litigation
Anup Malani and Charles Mullin∗
May 11, 2004
Abstract
Under the doctrine of joint and several liability, if two defendants
jointly share a liability and the ﬁrst becomes insolvent, his unpaid
liabilities may be reallocated to the second, solvent defendant. While
the second defendant’s assets may be suﬃcient to cover his own share
of the liability, they may be insuﬃcient to also cover the ﬁrst defen-
dant’s unpaid liability. As a result the ﬁrst defendant’s insolvency
may trigger the second defendant’s insolvency [26, 11].
The purpose of this paper is to quantify the pressure that one de-
fendant’s bankruptcy places on the solvency of co-defendants in the
context of mass torts subject to joint and several liability. The spe-
ciﬁc tort we examine is asbestos poisoning. We choose this example
because of the large number of companies – over 61 since 1982 [24,
p. 52] – that have gone bankrupt due to asbestos litigation and the
even larger number of companies – perhaps as many as 8,000 [6] –
that have been named as defendants in asbestos suits.
Using 10-K data from a number of large asbestos defendants and
a data set of all judgments in asbestos trials, we estimante that the
mean per-claim payments by major defendants grew an additional 5
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and 2002 due to the bankruptcy of jointly liable defendants during
this period. To put it another way, we conclude that, if no companies
had gone bankrupt between 1990 and 2002, the asbestos liabilities of
solvent, major asbestos defendants might have been less than two-
ﬁfths their present size.
Under the doctrine of joint and several liability, if two defendants jointly
share a liability and the ﬁrst becomes insolvent, his unpaid liabilities may be
reallocated to the second, solvent defendant. While the second defendant’s
assets may be suﬃcient to cover his own share of the liability, they may be
insuﬃcient to also cover the ﬁrst defendant’s unpaid liability. As a result the
ﬁrst defendant’s insolvency may trigger the second defendant’s insolvency
[26, 11]. The plaintiﬀ may be better oﬀ: with joint and several liability
she is able to recover from the second defendant all his assets, not just his
proportionate share of liability to the plaintiﬀ. But the second defendant’s
insolvency may cause dislocation to the defendant’s unsecured creditors and
workers.1
The purpose of this paper is to quantify the incentive that joint and
several liability provides for a defendant to go bankrupt once jointly liable
defendants go bankrupt. The magnitude of the incentive will depend on
the size of liabilities of previously solvent defendants relative to assets of
presently solvent companies, and the latter will vary by context. We seek to
illustrate how powerful this incentive can become by examining the amount
of liabilities transferred from insolvent to solvent defendants in the context
of modern mass tort litigation. The speciﬁct o r tw ee x a m i n ei sa s b e s t o s
poisoning. We choose this example because of the large number of companies
– over 61 since 1982 [24, p. 52] – that have gone bankrupt due to asbestos
litigation and the even larger number of companies – perhaps as many as
8,000 [6] – that have been named as defendants in asbestos suits.
Figure 1 illustrates the reason for concern. It plots the number of com-
panies that declared bankruptcy due to asbestos liabilities between 1982 and
1Stiglitz et al. [24, p. 52] estimate that asbestos bankruptcies have been responsible
for the loss of 52,000 - 60,000 jobs; that each of these workers lost on average $25,000 -
$50,000 in wages as a result of these bankruptcies; and that each of these workers who
were at ﬁrms with a 401(k) plan lost on average $8,300 in pension beneﬁts. Austern [4, p.
8] notes that, in 1988 dollars, the bankruptcy of Johns-Manville Co., which had a market
cap of $1.8 billion when it went bankrupt due to asbestos liabilities, cost $100 million in
transactions costs.
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ual defendant companies to individual plaintiﬀsw h oﬁled asbestos-related
tort claims between 1990 and 2002.2 T h er e a d e rw i l ln o t i c ei np a r t i c u l a r
the coincidence of sharp upswings in the number of bankruptcies and the
average payment per claim between 1998 and 2002. During the latter pe-
riod per-claim payments grew on average $155 – over 6 percent – for every
company that went bankrupt.
The analysis in this paper proceeds in two steps. First, we identify the
growth rate of payments by individual defendants to individual plaintiﬀso n
claims of illness due to asbestos exposure.3 This is estimated from 10-K
ﬁlings of certain large asbestos defendants, which cumulatively account for
30-50 percent of the universe of asbestos defendants by dollar of liabilities.
These data span the period 1990 - 2002 and cover over 3.9 million plaintiﬀs
and payments of nearly $15 billion.
T h eg r o w t hr a t eo fp a y m e n t sh a st w oc o m p o n e n t s . O n ei sn a t u r a lg r o w t h
that would exist even if defendants were not joint and severally liable for
asbestos poisoning. This natural growth may be due to discovery of new
evidence, changes in liability or damages rules, changes in litigation strategy,
or growth in the wages or savings of injured workers. The other component
of the overall growth rate of payments is growth due to joint and several
liability. Dividing the overall growth rate by the natural growth rate will
identify the growth rate due to joint and several liability.
Therefore, the second step of our analysis is to estimate the natural
growth rate of payments on claims. We estimate this growth rate of as-
bestos claim payments by exploiting the fact that joint and several liability
may raise the recovery from a particular defendant but should not raise the
recovery by the plaintiﬀ. When a defendant who jointly shares a liability
with a second defendant becomes insolvent, the liability faced by the second
defendant rises by the amount of the ﬁrst defendant’s liability that remains
unpaid. However, the sum of both defendants’ tort claim payments for
2We report a simple average of growth in per-claim payments across seven large asbestos
defendants that were solvent during the entire period of our study, 1990-2002, and for
whom we have 10-K data on asbestos payments.
3In this version of the paper we do not break down claim value growth by disease
of the tort claimant. The distribution of claims by disease is relatively constant over
our study period, even taking into account the disease mix of claims against companies
that go bankrupt during our study period. In future drafts we will attempt to provide
disease-speciﬁcg r o w t hr a t e s .
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Therefore, if one examines the sum of tort payments across all defendants
per plaintiﬀ for diﬀerent years, the growth rate that emerges is growth which
is independent of joint and several liability. We estimate the natural growth
rate using the same 10-K data as above plus a data set that includes the uni-
verse of awards in asbestos cases resolved through court judgment. Because
those judgments reﬂect the joint and several liability of the named defendant
for all possible defendants, they also reﬂect the natural growth rate of tort
payments.
We ﬁnd that the mean payment by a major asbestos defendant to resolve
an asbestos suit by a single plaintiﬀ grew 17 percent during each of two waves
of asbestos-related bankruptcies – the ﬁrst from 1990-1993 and the second
from 1999-2002. Yet the sum of payments per plaintiﬀ grew between 3 and
8.5 percent per year during the 1990-2002 period. Therefore, we estimate the
growth in per-claim payments attributable to these bankruptcy waves to be
at least 5 to10 percent annually or 56 to 157 percent over the entire 1990-2002
period. To put it another way, we conclude that, if no companies had gone
bankrupt between 1990 and 2002, the asbestos liabilities of solvent, major
asbestos defendants might have been as small as two-ﬁfths their present size.
This result is a contribution not just to the literature on joint and sev-
eral liability in tort law, but also to the literature on the resolution of tort
claims in bankruptcy and on the optimal mechanism – simple tort, class
actions, bankruptcy or legislative compensation – for resolving mass tort
claims. First, a number of scholars have suggested that tort claimants may
not be adequately compensated when defendants enter bankruptcy. Joint
and several liability theoretically solves this problem by reallocating an in-
solvent defendant’s liability to jointly liable but solvent defendants. This
paper demonstrates that this redistribution actually occurs in practice and
that, therefore, it may not be necessary – as some scholars suggest – to
increase the priority of all tort claimants in bankruptcy. Second, a num-
ber of scholars have argued that a class action, valuation of tort claims in
bankruptcy, or legislation of a workers’ compensation-type regime would be
a superior method to compensate victims of mass tort than resolution of in-
dividual claims in tort. One of the criticisms levied against the latter is that
it leaves the plaintiﬀ bearing the risk of defendant insolvency. Our ﬁndings
suggest otherwise.
This paper may be outlined as follows. Section 1 describes the doctrine
of joint and several liability and its interaction with bankruptcy law. Section
4
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recoveries due to joint and several liability. Section 3 presents our data, some
further technical details regarding our estimation strategy, and the results of
our analysis. It also draws out the implications of these results for joint and
several liability. Section 4 concludes with a discussion of the relevance of
our ﬁndings to bankruptcy law and mass tort compensation.
1 Legal background
Suppose that two defendants, D1 and D2, engage in "independent tortious
conduct that is a legal cause of an indivisible injury" to plaintiﬀ P valued at
L. Moreover, according to principles of comparative fault, D1 is responsible
for portion L1 and D2 for portion L2 of the plaintiﬀ’s total loss.4 The
Restatement (3d) of Torts §17 says that the defendants may be severally
liable or jointly and severally liable for that loss, depending on the law of the
applicable jurisdiction. If liability is several, to recover L1 the plaintiﬀ must
sue D1. To recover L2 she must sue D2. In contrast, if liability is joint and
several, P may sue either D1 or D2 for the entire injury L.
Table 1 indicates whether defendants are currently liable severally or joint
and severally for asbestos poisoning in each of the 50 states and D.C. Among
jurisdictions with joint and several liability, one can ﬁnd four distinct ﬂavors
of this doctrine. One imposes joint and several liability so long as the plaintiﬀ
has no comparative responsibility for her injury. Otherwise the defendants
are merely severally liable. A second imposes joint and several liability only
on defendants with comparative responsibility greater than some threshold,
typically 50 percent. A third imposes joint and several liability only for
a certain type – economic or noneconomic – of damages or for damages
below some ceiling. The ﬁnal rule imposes joint and several liability without
any conditions whatsoever. This last variant of the doctrine is called a pure
joint and several rule. At opposite ends of the spectrum, one ﬁnds 14 states
with several liability and 18 states with pure joint and several liability.
4The sum of these portions and the portion LP for which the plaintiﬀ is herself respon-
sible equals the total injury to the plaintiﬀ: L1 + L2 + LP = L.
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Suppose liability is joint and several and P sues D1 for the entire loss and does
not sue D2 at all. It is then the responsibility of D1 to seek compensation
from D2. D1 can do this in two ways. First, when P sues D1, D1 can
compel D2 to join the suit. Whether joinder is permitted depends on state
procedural rules.5 If joinder is permitted, P may recover L1 from D1 and L2
from D2 all in one legal action. Second, if D1 fails to join D2 and P obtains
aj u d g m e n tf o rL against D1, D1 can – again, state law permitting – ﬁle a
separate suit for contribution from D2.6 The size of the contribution depends
on whether state law permits D1 to recover from D2 a pro rata portion (L/2)
of the total loss or the portion (L2) dictated by comparative fault.7
Suppose again that liability is joint and several, but P sues both D1
and D2;t h a tD1 settles for S1;a n dt h a tD2 litigates. Despite joint and
several liability, the litigating defendant may not be responsible for the entire
liability. Most states have set-oﬀ rules that deduct from the total joint
and several liability of the litigating defendant either the amount of other
defendants’ settlements (pro tanto set-oﬀ) or the amount of other defendants
liabilities (proportional or comparative fault set-oﬀ). Thus, under a pro
tanto rule, the maximum exposure for D2 is L − S1. Under a proportional
rule, the maximum judgment is L − L1. Note that a joint and several
liability regime with a proportional set-oﬀ rule is very similar to several
liability regime.8
Suppose that D1 settles for S1 and D2 loses a judgment equal to J2.I f a
defendant’s settlement or judgment amount is less than his equitable share
of the total tort liability, then that defendant cannot seek contribution from
5Restatement (3d) Torts [25, §17 cmt. a] provides a survey of state joinder rules. In
federal court joinder is accomplished through an impleader action under Fed. R. Civ. Pro.
14(a), subject to limits under Rules 19 and 20.
6Failure to join the defendant from whom contribution is sought in the original action
by the plaintiﬀ is not generally a defense to a contribution action. However, there is a risk
that the contribution action will yield an inconsistent verdict on the same set of evidence
[13, p. 951].
7Restatement (3d) Torts [25, §23 cmt. a] provides a survey of state contribution laws.
The common law rule from Merryweather v. Nixan [1] prohibits contribution. Few states
follow this rule.
8There is also the theoretical possibility of a pro rata set-oﬀ rule, under which D2’s
maximum exposure is L/2 [25, §16 cmt. c]. No state has such a set-oﬀ rule. Kornhauser
and Revesz [14, pp. 438-440] and Hynes and Bonner [13, pp. 974-978] provide a survey of
set-oﬀ rules.
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contribution from D2.I f J2 <L 2,t h e nD2 cannot seek contribution from
D1. Conversely, if a defendant’s settlement or judgment is greater than his
equitable share of the total tort liability, then that defendant is immune from
contribution claims by other defendants [14, pp. 440-442].
Suppose that D1’s settlement or paid judgment exceeds his equitable
share of liability and D2’s settlement or paid judgment is less than his equi-
table share of the total tort liability. Can D1 seek contribution from D2?
If D2 settles, then D1 cannot seek contribution, though most jurisdictions
require that the settlement by D2 have been in good faith [25, §23 cmt. i].9
If D2 does not settle, then D1 may be able to seek contribution from D2.
However, many jurisdictions require the defendant who seeks contribution
to have fully extinguished the liability of the defendant from whom he seeks
contribution. Moreover, if D1 settles, he can only seek contribution from D2
if the plaintiﬀ, as part of her settlement with the D1, releases the D2 from
liability [25, §23 cmts. b, h]. These contribution rules are summarized in
Table 2.
1.2 Insolvent defendants
Of greater relevance to this paper is what happens if one of the defendants,
say D1,h a si n s u ﬃcient assets A1 to cover his portion L1 of the liability to
P. D1 may declare bankruptcy. If P has already obtained a judgment
against D1, then she must ﬁle a claim against D1’s estate. She has the
same priority as unsecured creditors. If P has been injured by D1 and has
ﬁled suit but not obtained a judgment against D1, the bankruptcy court
must estimate the size of D1’s liability to P and permit a claim of that
value against the bankruptcy estate with the same priority as a claim by an
unsecured creditor.
I ft h e r ei sac l a s so fp l a i n t i ﬀs with pending suits or there is a class of people
that has been injured by D1 and has not ﬁled suit, but is very likely to do
so in the future, then the bankruptcy court is to estimate the size of D1’s
liabilities to such present and future plaintiﬀs, create – under §524(g) of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Act of 1978 – a trust to cover these liabilities, and ﬁnance
this trust with certain of D1’s assets. The assets the court can allocate
9Courts are divided on whether the good faith inquiry is a procedural inquiry or a
substantive one that requires a comparison of S1 with a quick estimate of L1 [14, p. 441].
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value of their secured claims and then giving unsecured ordinary creditors
a portion of the remaining assets equal to their share of the total claims
by unsecured ordinary creditors and tort claimants against D1.T h a t s a i d ,
there are certain assets that are most valuable in the hands of the trust and
therefore ﬁnd their way there. These include insurance policies to cover D1’s
tort liabilities and contribution claims that D1 may have against jointly liable
defendants. Other generic assets – cash or equipment – also ﬁnd their way
into the trust. Because tort claimants have less priority than secured credit,
the trust is also likely to contain D1’s equity. Hence the plaintiﬀs are likely
to own the ﬁrm after bankruptcy, though they are permitted to sell their
shares at any time.
What happens to the unpaid portion of D1’s liability, L1 − A1?I n a
jurisdiction with several liability, the loss is borne by the plaintiﬀ. D2 can
only be held responsible for L2. In joint and several jurisdictions, however,
some of the loss may be reassigned to D2. The fraction of L1 − A1 for
which D2 can be held liable depends on whether the state in which P brings
her suit has a pure joint and several rule or a reallocation statute. If the
state has a pure joint and several rule, D2 c a nb eh e l dl i a b l ef o ra l lo fL1 −
A1 [25, §10 cmt. b]. If the state has a reallocation rule that permits an
insolvent defendant’s liability to be assigned solely to solvent defendants, D2
can again be held liable for all of L1−A1. If the reallocation statute permits
an insolvent defendant’s liability to be assigned to both solvent defendants
and the plaintiﬀ, D2 c a no n l yb eh e l dl i a b l ef o raf r a c t i o no fD1’s unpaid
liability. This fraction is L2/(L2 + LP), w h i c hi se q u a lt oh i sc o m p a r a t i v e
fault relative to that of the plaintiﬀ. The plaintiﬀ bears the remaining share
of D1’s unpaid liability [25, §17].
Table 1 lists which states permit an insolvent defendant’s liabilities to be
reallocated at all or completely to solvent defendants. 24 states and D.C.
permit reallocation of asbestos liabilities to solvent defendants. It should be
noted that this number has fallen in recent years because a number of states
have only recently – in the 1986-1987 or in the late 1990s – reformed their
tort law to eliminate pure joint and several liability.
As a technical matter, neither the pure joint and several rule nor reallo-
cation statutes specify whether L1 or L1 −A1 is to be reassigned to D2 and,
perhaps, P. In practice, however, it appears that L1 is reassigned and D2
and P are permitted to seek contribution out of A1 from D1’s estate. This
assessment is based on cases, such as Hosley v. Armstrong Cork Co. (Minn.
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plans for defendants who ﬁle for bankruptcy due to asbestos liabilities. Re-
allocation statutes are silent with regard to the amount to be reallocated and
the few courts that have addressed the issue reassign L1 rather than L1−A1.
Moreover, trust distribution plans appear to contain provisions whereby de-
fendants jointly liable with a bankrupt defendant may seek contribution from
the latter’s estate [18, 3, §5.6]. That said, we have spoken to trustees of tort
victim trusts of such bankrupt entities as UNR and found that few if any
contribution claims have been made, let alone paid out, by these trusts.
Suppose D1 goes bankrupt because it has fewer assets than its share of
liabilities, D1’s liabilities are reallocated to D2,b u tD2 does not have enough
assets to cover its own liability plus D1’s, i.e., L2 <A 2 <L 1 + L2. D2
may also declare bankruptcy. A natural question is: can D2’s estate, having
perhaps established a trust with assets to cover not just L2 but also some
of L1, seek contribution against the estate of D1?A s f a r a s w e k n o w , t h i s
question has not been answered by any court.10 Whatever the answer turns
out to be, however, D2 will still have been forced into bankruptcy and will
n o tb ea b l et oo b t a i nm o r et h a nA1 <L 1 in contribution. This and other
rules concerning reallocation and contribution with insolvent defendants are
reproduced in Table 2.
To summarize, if one defendant has insuﬃcient assets to cover his share of
a joint and several liability to a plaintiﬀ, that defendant’s liabilities may be
reallocated to a jointly liable but solvent defendant. If the second defendant
ends up paying more than his equitable share of the liability, he can seek
contribution from the bankruptcy estate of the ﬁrst defendant, though in
practice such actions are rare. If, however, the second defendant does not
have suﬃcient assets to cover both his own share of the joint liability and the
reassigned portion of the ﬁrst defendant’s share of that liability, the second
defendant may also end up bankrupt.
10However, we see no reason why, if D2’s trust has assets greater than D2’s equitable
share of liability plus the unpaid portion of D1’s liabilities, D2 should not be able to seek
contribution from D1’s estate.
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2.1 Simpliﬁed empirical model
The methodology in this paper can be illustrated by means of a simple two
period model. Suppose there are three defendants (D1,D 2,D 3)a n dt w o
plaintiﬀs( P1,P 2). Each plaintiﬀ has suﬀered the same injury, say mesothe-
lioma from exposure to asbestos. All three defendants are jointly liable for
the injury to each plaintiﬀ. Moreover, for simplicity, assume the share of
each defendant’s liability to P1 is identical to the share of that defendant’s
liability to P2. These shares are (S1,S 2,S 3). The only diﬀerence between
the two plaintiﬀsi st h a tP1 sues in period t,a n dP2 in period t+1.T h e o n l y
change in the defendants across the two periods is that D1 goes bankrupt
between the two periods.
The total liability of the three defendants to P1 is Lt, where the subscript
indicates that P1 sues on this liability in period t. The total liability to P2
is Lt+1. Because both plaintiﬀss u ﬀer the same injury, we deﬁne the natural
growth rate of tort claim values to be NG = Lt+1/Lt.T h i s g r o w t h m a y
be due to discovery of new evidence that suggests the defendants are more
culpable than previously thought, to changes in liability rules that makes it
easier for a plaintiﬀ to prove her case, to a change in damages rules that
makes a greater share of a plaintiﬀ’s injury compensable by the defendants,
to changes in litigation strategy by the plaintiﬀ that exploits these rules, or
to growth in the wages or savings of injured plaintiﬀs[ 2 ] .
Assume that the parties are in a jurisdiction with joint and several liability
for asbestos poisoning and with a reallocation rule that permits reassignment
of all of an insolvent defendant’s liabilities to solvent defendants (but not
plaintiﬀs). Moreover, assume no contribution claims are possible against
bankrupt entities. The total liability of a solvent defendant, say D2,i s















The second term in each of the brackets reﬂects the fact that D1 has gone
bankrupt. Due to the reallocation rule, his share of the liability to P2 is
reassigned to D2 in proportion to his share of liability to P2 relative to other
solvent defendants, here just D3.W e w i l l d e ﬁn et h eg r o w t hr a t eo ft o r t
claim liability of D2 due to the bankruptcy of D1 to be BG = S1/(S2 + S3)
10
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(The bankruptcy-induced growth rate of tort claim values against D3 is the
same.)
Suppose that one only observes the tort payment history of solvent de-
fendants, i.e., {L1t}, {L2t,L 2t+1}a n d{ L3t,L 3t+1}. This is due to the fact
that there are far more plaintiﬀs than defendants. Through the end of 2003,
there were 700,000 plaintiﬀs compared with 8,000 defendants [6, 7]. More-
over, there are no requirements that plaintiﬀs report their asbestos gains.
As for insolvent defendants, they may enter bankruptcy when their expected
liabilities exceed their expected ability to pay into the future. However, it
may not be clear for some time how large their actual unpaid liabilities are.
In addition, for any plaintiﬀ-insolvent defendant pair, it is unclear who ex-
actly are the jointly liable but solvent defendants. This is not to say data on
the tort payment history of solvent defendants is easy to obtain, an issue we
will address below, but those data are easier to gather and more informative
than other payment data.
The goal of our analysis is to estimate the bankruptcy-induced growth
rate of tort claim values for solvent defendants given the tort payment histo-
ries of the solvent defendants. This can be accomplished by taking advantage
of a basic but important feature of joint and several liability. Although the
doctrine may raise the tort liabilities of a solvent defendant once a jointly-
liable defendant becomes insolvent, it theoretically does not raise the to-
tal tort recovery of any given plaintiﬀ from all solvent defendants. Thus
L2t+1 + L3t+1 = Lt+1. Therefore, we can estimate the natural growth rate






L1t + L2t + L3t
. (2)
The other statistic that we can estimate with solvent defendants’ tort
payment data is the growth rate of any given solvent defendant’s tort pay-
ments. This growth rate can, as demonstrated in the following equation, be
decomposed into the product of the natural growth rate of tort claims values
and the growth rate of the value of tort claims against solvent defendants













=[ 1+BG] × NG (3)
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should be able to estimate the bankruptcy-induced growth rate of tort claims
by BG =( G2/NG)−1,w h e r eNGis estimated from (2) and G2 is estimated
from (3).
2.2 Complications
A number of issues may arise that complicate the calculations from the pre-
vious section. For example, what happens if one of the defendants, say
D2, is in a joint and several jurisdiction but the other is in a several juris-
diction? Where one defendant, say D2, is in a several liability state, D3
may be solely be held liable for the insolvent defendant’s share of the lia-
bility. The bankruptcy-induced growth rate in his claim values would be
G3 = S1/S3. There would be no bankruptcy-induced growth in D2’s claim
values. If we calculated separately the bankruptcy-induced growth rate for
each solvent defendant, this would be no concern. Because we provide the
average bankruptcy-induced growth rate across solvent defendants, however,
there will be some error in our estimates. Nevertheless, the greater the
number of claims subject to several liability, the lower will be our estimate
of this average growth rate. Moreover, any error should be slight because
most asbestos injuries occurred before 1979, the year asbestos stopped be-
ing manufactured in the U.S., and only three states (Kansas, Vermont, and
Wyoming) had deviated from the rule of pure joint and several liability by
that point.
Two other issues are analogous in eﬀect to the growth of several liability
jurisdictions. These are that some states do not authorize reallocation of
an insolvent defendants liabilities to solvent defendants and that defendants
who settle for less than their equitable share of liability after reallocation are
protected in most states from contribution claims. The existence of joint
and several states without reallocation is also subject to the caveat that most
asbestos liabilities arising from exposure before 1979 and that most state tort
reform statutes that abandon reallocation are adopted in 1986-1987 or the
late 1990s. Ultimately, these two issues, like that in the previous paragraph,
will appropriately be reﬂected in a lower estimate of the mean bankruptcy-
induced growth rate of claim values.
A second complication is that some courts may interpret their state’s
reallocation rule to only allow reassignment of unpaid (as opposed to all)
liabilities of the insolvent defendant or may permit solvent defendants to seek
12
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liabilities his §524(g) asbestos trust. In that case, the sum of tort payments
by solvent defendants is less than the total receipts by the plaintiﬀ: L2t+1 +
L3t+1 <L t+1Lt+1 = A1+L2t+1+L3t+1,w h e r eA1 is the insolvent defendant’s
assets available to P2. In order to estimate total receipts by the plaintiﬀ,a n d
thus the natural growth rate of tort claim values, one must include payments
by insolvent defendants. This is made diﬃc u l tb yt h ef a c tt h a tp a y m e n t s
by insolvent defendants may be delayed by many years due to the automatic
stay in bankruptcy and that it is diﬃcult to match the date of a payment by
solvent defendants with a date of payments by insolvent defendants to the
same plaintiﬀ. One factor that limits the impact of this shortcoming in our
analysis is that we have found no evidence either of courts permitting only
the reassignment of unpaid liabilities of insolvent defendants or of solvent
defendants seeking contribution from insolvent defendants.
A related issue is that some states permit reallocation of an insolvent
defendant’s liability to the plaintiﬀ as well as solvent defendants. This limits
the pressure that one defendant’s bankruptcy has on the ﬁnancial status of
other defendants. Therefore, it lowers the bankruptcy-induced growth rate
of claim values: BG = S1/(S2 + S3 + SP),w h e r eSP is the plaintiﬀss h a r eo f
liability. This reduction should be reﬂe c t e di no u re s t i m a t e so ft h i sg r o w t h
rate.
A third complication is that there may be a mismatch between the number
of claims ﬁled against insolvent defendants and solvent defendant. One
reason is that the cost of ﬁling a compensation claim against an asbestos
t r u s tf o r m e dw i t ha ni n s o l v e n td e f e n d a n t ’ sa s s e t sa r el o w e rt h a nt h ec o s to f
ﬁling a legal claim against a solvent defendant. This may raise the number of
claims against an insolvent defendant relative to the number of claims against
a jointly liable, solvent defendant. This is widely thought to be the reason,
for example, that the Manville Personal Injury Trust was forced to lower the
amount it paid on each dollar of liabilities from, e.g., $200,000 in 1988 to
$20,000 in 1995 on mesothelioma claims [4, 26, pp. 1323-1325]. A second
reason for the mismatch is that, whereas §524(g) trusts tend to have high
medical standards that must be met before any claim for compensation is
paid, solvent defendants do not apply very high standards for certain types of
legal claims ﬁled against it. The explanation is that the cost to the defendant
of enforcing these standards for certain – generally non-malignant – injuries
is greater than the cost of settling the legal claims. This encourages the ﬁling
of questionable if not baseless suits against solvent defendants [26, pp. 1330-
13
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We do not have the data to determine which eﬀect dominates and there-
fore which type of defendant attracts more suits. However, our concern is the
marginal eﬀect that insolvency of one defendant has on the value of claims
against remaining, solvent defendants. Therefore, the growth in the number
of claims against asbestos trusts does not concern us. Moreover, baseless
ﬁlings against a solvent defendant should be unaﬀected by the bankruptcy
of a small number of jointly liable defendants. The gain from such ﬁlings is
capped by the cost of enforcing certain medical standards. If a large number
of defendants declare bankruptcy, settlement values for the relevant injury
and any given solvent defendant rise and so solvent defendants may begin
enforcing medical standards. The number of claims of the relevant injury
against any given solvent defendant will fall, but tort payments on claims
proven valid will rise. Because the sum of claim values across defendants,
however, will not rise, our estimate of average bankruptcy-induced growth in
claim values will pick up the growth rate on claims proven valid.
A fourth complication is that courts may make errors in reallocation.
For example, they may under- or overestimate the share of liability owed by
insolvent defendants. This is not a serious problem because our goal is not to
determine the pressure that joint and several liability theoretically imposes
upon a solvent defendant after a jointly-liable defendant goes bankrupt, but
to determine the eﬀect that it actually has. This eﬀect includes court errors
in reallocation.
11The actuarial ﬁrm Tillinghast-Towers Perrin estimates that 94 percent of the 52,900
claims ﬁled in 2000 were by nonmalignant claimants. Of the $54 billion that RAND
estimates has been spent on asbestos litigation throgh 2001, about 65 percent of the funds
— after excluding transactions costs — went to nonmalignant claimants [7, p. vii].
Moreover, a number of studies have found that between two-thirds and 90 percent of
claimants are uninpaired. For example, in 1991 a federal judge had medical evidence in
65 asbestos cases ﬁled in the Southern District of Ohio validated by court-selected experts.
He found that 64 percent of claimants were free of any actionable condition. Of those the
remaining claimants, 85 percent had pleural plaque rather than asbestosis [23, p. 39]. A
separate study asked an independent panel of three radiologists to examine x-rays of 439
tire workers who had ﬁled for compensation due to asbestos exposure. They found that
only 11 to 16 x-rays – a mere 3.6 percent – suggested evidence consistent with exposure
to asbestos [21].
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This section describes precisely how we estimate the bankruptcy-induced
growth rate between 1990 and 2002. We do not have the data to obtain a
precise point-estimate of this growth rate. However, we do have data that
permits us to place bounds on this growth rate. Ultimately, we conclude that
the bankruptcy-induced growth rate between 5 and 10 percent per annum or
between 56 and 157 percent over the entire 1990-2002 period.
3.1 Data
We utilize three data sources for our analysis – corporate 10-K ﬁlings, Center
for Claims Resolution (CCR) resolved claims data, and the RAND asbestos
judgment database. 10-K ﬁlings of companies with substantial asbestos
liability include their aggregate asbestos-related loses (typically indemnity
and defense are reported as a single number) and the number of asbestos
personal-injury claims they have resolved. Since companies only report this
information once their asbestos liabilities have become sizeable, we only have
these data for large and relatively mature asbestos defendants. Most of the
companies in our 10-K data set are members of the Asbestos Claims Facility,
which in turn included most large, mature defendants and is the predecessor
of the CCR. The companies on which we have 10-K data report about $15
billion in asbestos-related losses between 1990 and 2002. CCR data provides
the number and disease composition of asbestos personal injury claims from
1990 through 2000. Almost every asbestos claimant names at least one
member of the CCR. Our ﬁnal data source is judgments awarded in 689
litigated asbestos personal-injury cases between 1994 and 1998. RAND
gathered these data and recorded the judgment date, jurisdiction ﬁled, and
the plaintiﬀ’s disease. These data are employed to validate our estimates of
the natural growth rate of claim values based on 10-K data.
The reader should note that the analysis in this paper focuses on average
claim values unconditional on the disease – mesothelioma, asbestosis, lung
cancer or pleural plaque. First, although claim values vary substantially
across these disease categories, Table 3 illustrates that the distribution of
claims against solvent defendants across the four major disease categories –
mesothelioma, lung cancer, other cancer, and non-malignant – has remained
stable between 1990 and 2000. Further, almost all mature defendants expe-
rienced a disease distribution virtually indistinguishable from the aggregate
15
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the bankruptcy induced growth rate in claims values is independent of disease
category. This is reasonable because, for example, the disease distribution
of claims against the Manville Personal Injury Trust is not dissimilar to the
disease distribution in Table 3 [4, p. 10].
3.2 An accounting of payments
Deﬁne Sj to be the equitable share of company j and Li to be the claim value















The ﬁrst term captures equitable share. The second term is the the product
of (a) the shares of bankrupt companies and companies who are not named
in the plaintiﬀ’s complaint that are reallocated to solvent and named defen-
dants, respectively, and (b) the share of reallocated liabilities that is assigned
to defendant j in particular. The overall share in the square brackets, which
we shall call the residual share, is multiplied by the total recovery owed to
the plaintiﬀ by all defendants.12
Equation (4) is a more precise rendition of (1). The main diﬀerence is
the inclusion of the reallocated shares of unnamed defendants. The goal of





which is the amount reallocated from bankrupt to solvent defendants.







12Actually, payments also reﬂect the amount not covered by other defendants who settled
and the amount below the residual share for which defendant j may settle. Because we
will be summing across all relevant defendants, howveer, these terms should cancel.
We assume that shares are constant across plaintiﬀs. This is technically incorrect, but
should not aﬀect our results. If we indexed shares by i,w ew o u l dc o u l du s et h et r i c k P
i xi
P
ij yij =¯ y
P






i xi, and estimate the weighted mean
of shares, where the weights were the liabilities owed to diﬀerent plaintiﬀs.
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[1 + Rbank,t+1 + Rnot-named,t+1]





where ¯ Lt is the total liability owed by all defendants to the average plain-
tiﬀ. This is independent of the identity of the defendant; variation across
payments to a plaintiﬀ by diﬀerent defendants is fully captured in the share
of that plaintiﬀ’s liability owed by diﬀerent defendants. Note that the eq-
uitable share of defendant j cancels out because it is unchanged over time;
most of these liabilities were generated 40 years before claims were ﬁled [4, p.
3]. The left-hand side term in (7) is the overall growth rate of payments from
defendant j to individual plaintiﬀs. The second term on the right-hand-side
is the natural growth rate of tort claims.










where ˆ NPj,t is the total number of plaintiﬀs reported in the company j’s
10-K as having settled complaints against it in year t,a n dˆ Tj,t is the total
amount company j’s 10-K reported that the company paid in t to resolve
asbestos claims.13 The next subsection discusses precisely how we estimate
13We acknowledge that the companies with 10-K ﬁlings that provide overall payments to
resolve asbestos liabilities are not representative of all companies with asbestos liabilities.
In particular, the 10-K companies are larger and more mature defendants. However, we
have no reason to think that the growth rate in their per plaintiﬀ payments is higher or
lower than the growth rate in such payments by smaller defendants. Moreover, because
the larger, more mature asbestos defendants have more at risk, they are more vulnerable,
all other things being equal, to bankruptcy. Therefore, the growth rate in their overall
claims are more relevant to determining the domino bankruptcy eﬀect of joint and several
liability in the asbestos context.
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lower bounds for the natural growth rate.
This leaves us with an estimate of
[1 + Rbank,t+1 + Rnot-named,t+1]
[1 + Rbank,t + Rnot-named,t]




[1 + Rbank,t + Rnot-named,t]
Gnot-named,t+1 =
(Rnot-named,t+1 − Rnot-named,t)
[1 + Rbank,t + Rnot-named,t]
are the growth rates of the reallocated shares from bankrupt and unnamed
defendants to solvent and named defendants, respectively. Because the
number of named companies rises over time, we expect that Gnamed,t+1 is
negative. Therefore, if we estimate Gbank,t+1 by simply subtracting one from
the left-hand side of (9), we will underestimate the growth in liability shares
reallocated from bankrupt to solvent, jointly-liable defendants.
3.3 Estimation of natural growth rate
We use two methods to estimate the natural growth rate ¯ Lt+1/¯ Lt.T h e ﬁrst
method employs as an estimator of ¯ Lt proxies for the total payment received
by an average asbestos plaintiﬀ in year t. One proxy is the total amount a
plaintiﬀ received from all defendants in our 10-K sample, assuming that the
plaintiﬀ named each defendant in the sample and got the average per-claim









where ˆ Tj,t is the total payment by company j from the 10-K sample in year
t and ˆ NPj,t is the number of diﬀerent plaintiﬀs that settled claims against
this company that year. The summation is over all companies in our 10-K
sample that were solvent in year t. Because this estimator holds constant
the number of companies named by the average plaintiﬀ and as naming rises
the number of plaintiﬀst h a tﬁle claims each company rise, the estimator
underestimates the true growth in the natural growth rate.
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This diﬀers from (10) in that it accounts for changes in patterns of naming
within our sample of 10-K companies. Because it holds constant naming
growth outside the 10-K sample, it will continue to underestimate the true
natural growth rate.14 Therefore, we treat this estimator and the last as
lower bounds on the natural growth rate and thus upper bounds on the
bankruptcy-induced growth rate. Note that these estimators for ¯ Lt permit
us to calculate the average natural growth rate for the entire sample period.
Our second method for estimating the natural growth rate takes advan-
tage of a “natural” experiment. Between 1994 and 1999 no signiﬁcant as-
bestos defendants declared bankruptcy. All other things being equal (which
we admit is questionable), the bankruptcy-induced growth rate during the
period 1994 to 1998, which we deﬁne as the experiment period, should be
zero. Therefore, an estimate of the overall growth in claim values during the
experiment period provides an estimate of the natural growth rate during
the entire 1990-2002 period, assuming this natural growth rate is the same
during the experiment and non-experiment period.
Asbestos bankruptcies occurred in two waves in the 1990s. Thirteen
asbestos defendants declared bankruptcy between 1989 and 1993 – which
we label bankruptcy wave I. Another 27 asbestos defendants declared bank-
ruptcy between 2000 and 2002 – bankruptcy wave II. Table 4 lists major
14Because the the number of defendants in our 10-K sample grows over time, however,
(11) will yield a lower estimate of the growth than (10).
Although (11) resembles our estimate (8) for the average payment by a defendant to a
given plaintiﬀ,i ti sd i ﬀerent in one critical respect. Whereas (8) measures the growth in
per plaintiﬀ payments for a given defendant j, the ratio of (11) for two consecutive periods
gives the growth in the average per plaintiﬀ payment across defendants.W h e n a j o i n t l y
liable defendant ﬁles for bankruptcy, if the number of defendants named increases by the
number who would have been named but ﬁle for bankruptcy, the average payment by a
defendant to a plaintiﬀ should not rise because the total amount paid by all defendants
does not rise. Thus, if the number of defendants named is constant over time, growth
estimates based on (11) should yield a result similar to growth estimates based (10).
However, even if the number of defendants is held constant, the reallocated liability may
be redistributed among solvent defendants such that each defendant’s residual share rises.
Equation (8) is formulated to calculate this growth for the individual defendant j.
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Only three asbestos defendants – Lykes Brothers Steamship, Rock Wool
Manufacturing, and Rutland Fire Clay – declared bankruptcy between the
two waves and they were minor players. Therefore, growth in claim values
between 1994 and 1999 should not be related to asbestos bankruptcies.
There is one hitch in our analysis. Although there were no major as-
bestos bankruptcies, the Georgine class action case unfolded during the nat-
ural experiment period. The Georgine class action was certiﬁed in 1993 and
dissolved in 1997 by Amchem Products v. Windsor. The uncertainty cre-
ated by Georgine impacted all asbestos defendants. For example, the CCR
settled about ﬁve times as many claims in both 1993 and 1998 than it set-
tled in any year in between. More importantly, most asbestos defendants
experienced a transitory spike in claim values after Georgine was dissolved.
B e c a u s ew ed e ﬁne the natural experiment period to end in 1998, the spike in
1997 and 1998 claim values following the dissolution of Georgine inﬂates the
growth in claim values during the experiment period. Therefore, the nat-
ural experiment estimator resembles an upper bound on the natural growth
rate, which translates into a lower bound on the bankruptcy-induced growth
rate.15
We calculate the mean overall growth rate during the experimental period
using (8) and using data on median court judgments in asbestos cases from
joint and several jurisdictions. The latter is a valid estimate of the natural
growth rate because defendants in court cases from joint and several liability
jurisdictions are assigned the aggregate liability owed by all defendants to
any plaintiﬀ.16
3.4 Estimates
The company-speciﬁc annual growth rates in payment by individual defen-
dants to individual plaintiﬀs during each bankruptcy wave are listed in Ta-
15It is not precisely an upper bound because, altough there may not have been any
bankruptcy-induced growth in claim values during the natural experiment period, there
was likely a reduction in claim values as the number of named defendants rose. This
tends to depress overall growth and thus our estimates of natural growth. However, we
believe, based on time-series of claim values, that the bias from including the Georgine
class action during the natural experiment period dwarfs the eﬀect from naming.
16In several liability jurisdictions, defendants are only assigned their proportionate share,
which reﬂects the natural growth rate so long as defendants equitable shares or defendant
composition does not change over time.
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ural growth rate, and equations (7) and (9) identify the bankruptcy-induced
growth rates for each company.
The second and third columns of Table 5 display our estimates of the
annual natural growth rate in claim values resulting from each of the es-
timators described above. The second column presents the growth rate in
nominal dollars, while the third presents the growth rate in real dollars. The
two proxies for the total payment received by the average plaintiﬀ suggest a
natural growth rate of 2.9 and zero percent, respectively, in nominal terms.
Both natural experiment estimators suggests a natural growth rate of 8.5
percent in nominal terms. In real terms, estimates of the natural growth
rate fall between minus three percent and six percent.
Figure 2 illustrates why we estimate zero real growth from aggregate
payments. Total payments increased by 33 percent from 1991 to 2001.
However, inﬂation was 30 percent over this period. Therefore, this measure
of payments indicates positive nominal growth in plaintiﬀ claim values, but
close to zero real growth. Figure 3 illustrates why we estimate zero nominal
growth from the estimator in (11). The average payment by each settling
defendant ranges from $3,000 to $4,500 and has no pattern over time. Thus,
although these companies are a select subset of asbestos defendants, the
average nominal settlement value across these companies does not grow over
time.
Finally, on a company-by-company basis, average payment per settled
claim rose 38 percent for companies in the 10-K data set during the experi-
ment period. We get an identical estimate of mean awards per plaintiﬀ from
our judgments data. This is equivalent to an average of 8.5 percent growth
annually. Inﬂation over this period averaged 2.4 percent annually, resulting
in 6.1 percent real growth.
The ﬁnal three columns of Table 5 present the bankruptcy-induced growth
rates from bankruptcy wave I, bankruptcy wave II, and the combined impact
of both bankruptcy waves. These estimates employ a weighted average of
the growth in payments by individual companies to individual plaintiﬀsf r o m
Table 6, where the weights are the size of each company’s mean payments.17
Allowing for the highest estimated natural nominal growth rate of 8.5 percent
17Using a straight average across companies has no impact on the bankruptcy-induced
growth rate during bankruptcy wave I, but increases the growth rate during wave II by
about 30 percentage points.
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percent. With zero real or zero nominal natural growth in claim values, the
two bankruptcy waves combined to increase defendant-speciﬁc claim values
by 157 percent or 200 percent, respectively. Based on these ﬁndings, we
conclude that the true bankruptcy-induced growth rate is likely to lie between
56 and 157 percent.18
3.5 Analysis
Our ﬁndings suggest that the bankruptcies of asbestos defendants in the
1990s substantially increased the asbestos liabilities of solvent defendants. In
particular, these bankruptcies increased the value of asbestos-related claims
at least 56 to 157 percent by 2002, which translates to annual bankruptcy-
induced growth of 5 to 10 percent. We say "at least" because plaintiﬀsn a m e d
an increasing number of defendants per complaint during the 1990s and, as
we explained in the discussion after equation (9), this depresses the overall
growth rate of per-claim payments by individual defendants once purged
of the natural growth rate of the value of these claims. Of course these
numbers mask a large number of bankruptcies, speciﬁcally 7 in wave I and 30
in wave II. Although the exact impact of any given bankruptcy on the value
of claims against remaining defendants depends on the aggregate liabilities
(and theoretically, assets) of the bankrupt entity, we can estimate the mean
eﬀect of any given bankruptcy. These are 3.7 to 8.8 percent per bankruptcy
in wave I and 0.6 to 1.6 percent per bankruptcy in wave II. The reason for
the reduction in the marginal impact of growth is likely the fact that earlier
bankruptcies involved larger defendants and that the number of companies
named by plaintiﬀsr o s eo v e rt i m e .
Because the bankruptcy of a defendant raises the liabilities, but not the
assets, of jointly liable, solvent defendants, it increases the pressure on the
latter to also ﬁle for bankruptcy. Of course the exact amount of pressure
depends on two omitted variables: the amount of solvent defendants’ assets
and the number of claims ﬁled. The former is diﬃcult to estimate in the
asbestos context, not just because it is diﬃcult to get precise values for
a corporation’s unsecured assets, but because joint and several liability is
18We use 157 percent estimate from the aggregate payment estimator rather than 200
percent estimate from the average claim value estimator because both estimators purport
to give us upper bounds on the natural growth rate and the aggregate payment estimator
is the lower of the upper bounds.
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attack any parties in the chain of distribution for asbestos. Therefore, it is
very diﬃcult to identify all possible defendants whose assets could be used
to satisfy tort claims. (Indeed, given the widespread use of asbestos, the
number of defendants may be quite large. Recall that over 8000 diﬀerent
companies have already been sued.)
However, it is possible to obtain data on the number of claims ﬁled annu-
ally. For example, the average number of ﬁlings against the 17 companies we
have 10-K data for has grown from 7,317 in 1990 to 34,026 in 2002, equivalent
to a compound rate of 13.7 percent. Our estimate is consistent with those
from other sources [7, p. 42]. Because the aggregate liability is the product
of the number of claims ﬁled and the value of claims ﬁled, growth in liability
is the product of the percentage growth in ﬁlings and claim values. (So, e.g.,
if ﬁlings double and claim values double, overall payments quadruple.)
4C o n c l u s i o n
The primary contribution of this paper is concrete evidence that, because of
joint and several liability, the bankruptcy of one defendant places signiﬁcant
pressure on the ﬁnancial status of jointly liable but still solvent defendants.
A second, but equally important, contribution is that it undercuts the claim
that tort claimants are undercompensated because defendants may be judg-
ment proof. When the liability is shared – in a joint and several sense –
between a judgment-proof and a solvent defendant, the tort claimant appears
to recover at least a portion of her claim against the insolvent defendant from
the solvent defendant. The extent of the reallocation is uncertain. However,
our estimate of the share of aggregate liabilities that have been reassigned
– at least one-third to three-ﬁfths19 – are not implausible estimates of the
share of aggregate liability owed companies who went bankrupt in the 1990s.
This ﬁnding is relevant to calls in the bankruptcy literature for raising the
eﬀective priority of tort claimants. These proposals include simply elevating
the formal priority of tort claimants in bankruptcy [19, 20, 16]; eliminat-
19This is calculated as follows. Suppose there are two defendant with constant liabilities
shares of S1 and S2, respectively, over time. If the ﬁrst defendant goes bankrupt, then the
second, solvent defendant’s liability share – holding constant natural growth – increases
from S2 to S1 + S2 =1 ,o ra tar a t eo fg = S1/S2. Therefore, the ﬁrst defendant’s share
is S1 = g/(1 + g).
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bankruptcy the tort victim can seek compensation pro rata from sharehold-
ers; not discharging tort claims in bankruptcy [5]; and requiring companies
to purchase insurance to cover the risk of insolvency to tort claimants [?].
The logic behind these reforms is that tort claimants may not be eﬃcient
bearers of the risk that the tortfeasor may become insolvent. Because the
tort claimant, unlike other creditors, is unable to contract with the tortfea-
sor before the tort occurs, the parties cannot voluntarily allocate the risk to
the tortfeasor when eﬃcient. The bankruptcy court can solve this problem
either by raising its estimate of tort claim values or, equivalently, raising the
priority of tort claimants. This simply reallocates some of the risk of insol-
vency to other creditors, who are able to contract for this ex ante. A second
reason for raising the eﬀective priority of tort claimants is that these other
creditors may ﬁnd it more cost eﬀective to monitor the tortfeasor’s behavior
so as to limit the probability of the tort than to provide insurance for the
additional risk associated with raising the priority of tort claimants. In that
case, the tort claimant is less likely to be injured in the ﬁrst place [19, pp.
1052-1054].
Our analysis suggests that this reallocation of risk is unnecessary where
the tort committed is subject to the rule of joint and several liability. Un-
der this condition, the risk of insolvency is in practice reallocated to solvent,
jointly liable defendants. To the extent that joint and several reallocation
takes into account superpriority in bankruptcy, i.e., tort courts reallocate
only the unpaid portion (as opposed to all) of the insolvent ﬁrm’s tort liabil-
ity, superpriority will simply redistribute risk from solvent joint defendants
and to other creditors. Such a redistribution appears neither to serve the
goal of monitoring or to promote fairness. If joint and several liability re-
allocation does not take into account superpriority, then superpriority will
exacerbate the potential for double recovery by tort claimants from solvent
joint defendants. If tort courts do not credit solvent defendants payments
made by insolvent defendants pursuant to a claim, then the solvent defen-
dants must seek contribution from insolvent defendants. If transactions costs
prevent this, tort claimants may double recover for a portion of their injuries.
The larger these claimants’ recovery from the insolvent entity, the larger that
double recovery. Although this paper does not quantify the extent of double
recovery, if any, we hope in future research to determine whether it occurs in
practice.
This paper is also relevant to the debate over how the U.S. should manage
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advocated in the academic literature: class actions, bankruptcy, and a leg-
islative trust fund. Advocates for class actions argue that it is less costly
than individual-by-individual litigation. It also oﬀers defendants a ﬁnal res-
olution of their liabilities [22]. The diﬃculty is that the Supreme Court in
Amchem Products Inc. v. Windsor (1997) and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.
(1999) refused to certify a class in asbestos cases because, among other things,
future claimants would not be adequately represented. Advocates of the
bankruptcy mechanism argue that it oﬀers better procedural protections for
future claimants than class actions [8, pp. 1457-1461]. Indeed, Congress has
codiﬁed these in §524(g) of the Bankruptcy Act. However, this protection
has been criticized as less than adequate. For example, while the Code au-
thorizes a future claimants representative in §1109(b), votes of 75 percent of
existing claimants are suﬃcient to conﬁrm a reorganization plan. This tilts
the ultimate outcome in favor of present claimants [27, p. 53]. Moreover,
future claimants are still bear a disproportionate amount of the risk asso-
ciated assets of the §524(g) trust because they are compensated later than
present claimants [15]. Few scholars argue against a legislative solution.
The diﬃculty lies in determining the appropriate amount of funding for a
government trust and allocating those costs between defendant companies
and their insurers. So far these eﬀorts have proven unsuccessful.
While we understand the merits of – and indeed subscribe to – a na-
tional workers compensation-type solution, the ﬁndings in this paper suggests
a fourth approach to mass tort: where liability is joint and several, let the
tort system continue to manage compensation. There is no evidence that
claimants from 2002 fare any worse than those from the 1990s. When a
defendant goes bankrupt, other solvent defendants appear to end up bearing
a sizeable amount of unpaid liabilities. The tort system is not perfect. It
has been criticized, e.g., for the amount of legal fees it generates. Some esti-
mates put these fees as high as 65 percent of total payments by defendants.
But this criticism may also be leveled at class action settlements20 and, to
20But see [?].
The tort system may also be criticized for burdening plaintiﬀs with the risk that the
total assets of all theoretically culpable defendants under even the joint and several rule is
insuﬃcient to cover the cost of all asbestos injuries. But this is a criticism that complicates
all approaches to mass tort. Settlements are limited by available defendants and assets.
Plaintiﬀs may actually do worse in bankruptcy becau s et h e yh a v et os h a r eu n s e c u r e da s e t s
with ordinary unsecured creditors. Finally, the fact of a limited amount of assets suggest
25
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Presssome degree, at bankruptcy. Our point is only that the tort system may not
be as imperfect as many scholars suggest when it comes to insuring victims
of torts subject to joint and several liability from the risk of insolvency.
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http://law.bepress.com/uvalwps/olin/art1Table 1: Liability for asbestos exposure in the 50 states and D.C.
State
Liability rule for asbestos 
claims (D is defendant, 
P is plaintiff)
To whom may 
insolvent's liability 
be reallocated? State
Liability rule for asbestos 
claims (D is defendant, 
P is plaintiff)
To whom may 
insolvent's liability 
be reallocated?
AK Pure J&S D NH Pure J&S or J&S if share 
> 50%
AL Pure J&S D NJ J&S if share > 5% to 
60%
AR Pure J&S D NM Several
AZ Several NV Pure J&S D
CA J&S for econ. damages NY Pure J&S D
CO Several OH J&S for econ. damages 
if share > 50%
CT J&S for econ. damages D (econ. damages) OK J&S if plaintiff w/o fault
DC Pure J&S D OR J&S for econ. damages 
if share > 15% and > P's 
share
D if share > 25% 
and > P's share
DE Pure J&S D PA Pure J&S D
FL J&S for econ. damages 
up to flexible cap
RI Pure J&S D
GA J&S if plaintiff w/o fault SC Pure J&S D
IA J&S for econ. damages 
if share > 50%
SD J&S (liable only up to 2x 
share)
D
ID Several TN Several
IL J&S if share > 25% TX J&S if P's share < sum 
of Ds' shares
IN Several UT Several D (if insolvent's 
share < 40%)
HI Pure J&S D VA Pure J&S D
KS Several VT Several
KY Several WA Pure J&S D
LA Several WI J&S if share > 51%
MA Pure J&S D WV Pure J&S D
MD Pure J&S D WY Several
ME Pure J&S D
MI Several
MN J&S (but if below 15% 
share, liable only up to 
4x share)
D, P
MO J&S if plaintiff w/o fault D and (if P is at 
fault) P
MS J&S below 50% of total 
damages
MT J&S if share > 50% D if share > 50%
NC Pure J&S D
ND Several
NE J&S for econ. damages
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Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic PressTable 2: Contribution rules based nature and size of payments by defendants
and by solvency of defendants.


























































































http://law.bepress.com/uvalwps/olin/art1Table 3: Distribution of claims across disease-types, by year of settlement,
1990-2000.
Year of settlement Non-malignant Other cancer Lung cancer Mesothelioma
1990 85.89% 2.01% 7.60% 4.51%
1991 88.30% 1.44% 6.59% 3.66%
1992 84.35% 3.26% 8.79% 3.60%
1993 88.87% 1.80% 6.57% 2.77%
1994 86.09% 2.56% 7.54% 3.81%
1995 85.42% 1.81% 7.41% 5.36%
1996 86.74% 2.00% 6.85% 4.41%
1997 83.66% 2.53% 7.83% 5.99%
1998 87.46% 1.92% 6.54% 4.07%
1999 91.02% 1.57% 4.73% 2.67%
2000 86.55% 2.37% 6.66% 4.43%
Percent of claims by disease
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Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic PressTable 4: Timing of major asbestos-related bankruptcies during 1990-2002.
Bankruptcy wave Company Year of bankruptcy
Raybestos 1989
Celotex (Carey Canada) 1990
National Gypsum 1990
Eagle Picher Industries 1991
Keene Corporation 1993
Armstrong World Industries 2000








Harbison Walker Refractory Company 2002
Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Company 2002




http://law.bepress.com/uvalwps/olin/art1Table 5: Estimates of the natural and bankruptcy-induced growth rate.
Real Nominal Wave 1 Wave 2
Com-
bined
1a - aggregate payment 0.2% 2.9% 62% 59% 157%
1b - average payment -2.7% 0.0% 75% 72% 200%
1994 to 1999 “natural” 






Table 6: Company-speciﬁc growth in claim values.
Wave 1 Interim Wave 2
Grace -10% 18% 17%
FWC 52% -7% 32%
CCK 5% 4% 34%
Coltec -2% -7% 35%
GP 24% 17% 36%
B&W 33% 9% 0%
OI 38% 22% -10%
ABB n/a -3% 10%
Kaiser 0% 3% 42%
HAL -10% -17% 37%
Weighted ave. 17% 9% 17%
Company
Ave. annual growth in nominal claim values
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Average payment per claim
Figure 1: New asbestos-related bankruptcy ﬁl i n g sp e ry e a ra n dt h ea v e r a g e
payment per tort claim by certain large asbestos defendant companies, 1982-
2002. (Average payment is per company for seven large asbestos defendants







1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Figure 2: Total asbestos liability costs across all companies in 10-K data set,
by year, 1990-2002.
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1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Figure 3: Average claim values of companies in 10-K data set (including
defense costs and dismissals), by year, 1990-2002.
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